10/08/2026
On Monday 13 July 2026, the County Court at Portsmouth handed down its reserved Judgment in an Application to Vary an Injunction Order brought by Bevan Brittan LLP on behalf of Stonewater Limited (the “Application”).
The Application was brought to invite the Court to vary an Access Injunction Order granted by District Judge Pain on 5 January 2026 (the “Injunction Order”) so as to include ‘forced entry’ provisions which had been refused by that (District) Judge at first instance. This was sought pursuant to Circuit Judge Berkley’s decision in Sovereign Housing Association Ltd. v Hall (2024) where he had confirmed that CPR 70.2A can be utilised to allow a landlord to enter tenanted premises by force where the tenant had failed to comply with an access injunction.
The Application was issued and was listed for hearing on 18 May 2026 before His Honour Judge Glen.
At the hearing, HHJ Glen engaged with CPR 70.2A (the mechanism whereby, where a party is a "disobedient party", the Court may direct that the “act required to be done” pursuant to an injunction order could, instead, be carried out by another party). However, his difficulty with the application of CPR 70.2A in these circumstances was that "the act required to be done" was to allow access, and this, he thought, is conceptually very different to forcing access. As he explained, he was not persuaded that the Court could require “the act to be done” (i.e. allowing access) by directing that the Claimant could break down the door.
HHJ Glen reserved his judgment and invited Stonewater to file written submissions addressing this very specific point -- i.e. the applicability of CPR 70.2A to justify an award of forced entry in access injunction proceedings.
Stonewater, through its solicitors Bevan Brittan LLP, instructed Thomas Rothwell of Falcon Chambers to draft written submissions on its behalf, and these were filed at Court on 28 May 2026.
The Facts
The Defendant occupied the Property pursuant to a Deed of Assignment dated 1 April 2019. They took on an assured tenancy which had commenced on 5 December 2008.
Pursuant to Clause 3.16 of the original Tenancy Agreement, the Defendant was bound:
“To allow the Association’s employees or contractors acting on behalf of the Association access at all reasonable hours of the daytime to inspect the condition of the premises or to carry out repairs or otherworks to the premises or adjoining property (The Association will normally give at least 48 hours’ notice but immediate access may be required in an emergency.) Notwithstanding this, if, in the opinion ofthe Association, there is an emergency from which personal injury or damages [sic] to the premises or neighbouring property might result, the tenant agrees to allow officers or agents of the Association to enter the premises using such means as necessary without first giving notice.”
The Defendant had failed to comply with this provision of the Tenancy Agreement in respect of an outstanding Electrical Installation Condition Report (EICR) inspection at the Property.
After the initial Injunction Order had been granted, it was personally served on the Defendant on 15 January 2026.
It was only after 3 further unsuccessful, well-evidenced, post-Injunction Order access attempts at the Property that Stonewater brought this Application to Vary.
The Law
CPR 70.2A provides that:
“(2)…if a mandatory order, an injunction or a judgment or order for the specific performance of a contract is not complied with, the court may direct that the act required to be done may, so far as practicable, be done by another person, being—
(a) the party by whom the order or judgment was obtained …”.
There has been a number of recent County Court decisions on the application of CPR 70.2A to access injunction proceedings to justify the award of forced entry:
Sovereign Housing Association Ltd v Hall (2024)
This matter was an appeal from a District Judge sitting in Gloucester County Court who had dismissed an application for forced entry on the basis that committal was the proper remedy for a failure to comply with an access injunction order.
The appeal was heard by His Honour Judge Berkley in Bristol County Court wherein he held that CPR 70.2A was plainly applicable where an injunction had been made and not complied with.
In his Judgment, he commented that:
“It seems to me that the court must be in a position to be able to enforce orders that it makes of this nature and I find that Rule 70.2A covers this precise circumstance. […] The court is therefore empowered to order that the claimant carry out the act required to be done, namely the granting of access to the property […] The fact that access is gained by unconventional means is nothing to the point […]”.[12]
Southern Housing v. Emmanuel [2026] L &TR 9
In Southern Housing, District Judge Cridge of Bromley County Court took a different view. He held that CPR 70.2A could not be used as the basis for a ‘forced entry’ order in the absence of some statutory authority for it. He reviewed of a number of authorities emphasising the sanctity of a person’s home, and concluded that there is nothing in CPR 70.2A creating a new right of entry such as to override those authorities to permit forced entry. In his view, a tenant has exclusive possession of their tenanted Property and, accordingly, any unauthorised entry to the Property by their landlord would be trespass.
District Judge Cridge also considered that CPR 70.2A could not apply in any case because the “act required to be done” under the initial injunction order was to permit the Claimant to enter the property. District Judge Cridge’s view was that that cannot be done by any other person not either inside the property or in possession of a key. Forced entry, in his mind, was a different act altogether, and could not fall under the category of “the act required to be done” pursuant to CPR 70.2A(2). District Judge Cridge therefore concluded that: “In my view there is no power under 70.2A to vary the original order” [68].
Taylor Clark Ltd v Mohamed (Central London County Court, 5 March 2026)
Here, District Judge Le Bas of the Central London County Court disagreed with District Judge Cridge. In his view, when making an order authorising access, the Court was merely giving effect to the tenant’s contractually-binding consent for the landlord to access a property (as set out in the tenancy agreement).
The access injunction, therefore, orders the tenant not to give permission for access, but to facilitate access in accordance with their obligations under the tenancy agreement. And this is an act which a landlord can do themselves on application pursuant to 70.2A. No ‘new’ right of entry is created by doing so, and the landlord is not ‘forcing entry’, District Judge Le Bas thought, so much as simply opening the door when the tenant has failed to do so.
Plymouth Community Homes Limited v Mr Lee Hammond [2026] EWCC 27
District Judge James of Plymouth County Court took a similar position.
Dealing with District Judge Cridge’s first point, he considered that, although entry to property by a landlord without consent would of course constitute trespass, a landlord’s entry to a property is not trespass because the tenant has already permitted it by virtue of the access clause(s) in their tenancy agreement.
And dealing with District Judge Cridge’s second point, about the applicability of CPR 70.2A, District Judge James took the view that CPR 70.2A can be used to justify a landlord’s entry by force, as a landlord can carry out the “act required to be done”, albeit by a different method (i.e. forcing the door, rather than unlocking and/or simply opening it).
However, District Judge James caveated his decision by confirming that the tenant’s Article 8 Rights (Respect for Private and Family Life) were engaged, and he had in fact required the Claimant to (a) provide details of any known vulnerabilities of the Defendant, and (b) complete and file a risk assessment in respect of the forced entry sought and the impact it would have on the occupants. He was satisfied, on this evidence, that forced entry was appropriate in the circumstances, but indicated that he would not have awarded it had there been any indication that to do so would cause serious harm to the tenant.
Thomas Rothwell, Counsel, who drafted the Claimant’s written submissions in Stonewater v Rosie-Marie Harris, also acted for the Claimant in Taylor Clark Ltd v Mohamed. In the course of his written submissions in Stonewater, he deftly landed the following points:
Southern Housing v Emmanuel [2025] EWCC 58 was wrongly decided because it assumes the Court is being asked to authorise entry without the tenant’s consent. In actual fact, a tenant’s power to exclude a landlord from their Property is necessarily subject to any rights which they have already granted their landlord to enter that property (i.e. access covenants in the tenancy agreement).
Therefore, if a landlord enters in accordance with those rights, they are not a trespasser, and where the Court orders a tenant to “permit” or “allow” access to a Property, the Court is not ordering the tenant to give permission for access to be granted, but rather to facilitate access in accordance with the contractually-binding consent already given via their tenancy agreement.
If, on the application of CPR 70.2A, the “act required to be done” is, therefore, the facilitation of access (i.e. by unlocking/opening the door), that is something quite different to permitting a landlord to access without a tenant’s consent -- something which District Judge Cridge thought could not be authorised absent statutory authority to do so.
The Decision
In effect, the decision HHJ Glen had to make was whether the Court has power, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by CPR 70.2A(2), to order that a landlord may force entry to premises occupied by a tenant for the purposes of inspecting the gas or electrical installations in those premises.
In summary, he made the following findings:
- District Judge Cridge’s conclusion in Southern Housing - that a Court has no power to authorise entry to someone’s home absent statutory authority - cannot be supported;, indeed, as he pointed out, a Court has made such an order (a ‘search and imaging order’) in Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55;
- The ‘deemed consent’ approach of District Judge Le Bas in Taylor Clark likewise cannot be supported:
“In covenanting to allow access, the tenant is binding themselves contractually to give access when asked to do so. They are not agreeing that the landlord can without more enter the premises as and when notice to do so has been given” [25];
- District Judge James’ analysis of (CPR 70.2A) in Plymouth Community Homes is the correct approach: The “act required to be done” is ‘enabling the landlord to obtain access’; and, according to HHJ Glen, “if it cannot be enabled by the tenant’s consent, then in my judgment CPR70.2A(2) permits the Court to empower the landlord to enable access in another way” [27].
In HHJ Glen’s Judgment:
“District Judges and Deputy District Judges do in principle have the power to make an order permitting landlords to force access to rented property in order to carry out gas and electrical safety inspections.” [29]
The Guidance
His Honour Judge Glen did, however, indicate that the above power ought to be subject to the following:
- Whilst technically possible for ‘forced access’ to be granted on a first-instance injunction application, it will not normally be appropriate to do so, given “the serious nature of the interference with a tenant’s property and [European Human Rights] Convention rights”. [29.i)]
- On any application for forced entry, the Court will expect to be provided with information regarding the identity and personal circumstances of the tenant and their household, including anything in relation to known or potential vulnerabilities [29.ii)]
- “Any order should provide that forced access should only take place on 48 hours prior notice. Plainly, the Claimant should not proceed where the tenant is present and actively opposes entry.” [29.iii)]
- A provision for the affixing of a key safe to the outside of the Property (containing the new keys to the Property, after the locks had been changed following entry by force) represents “good practice”. [29.iv)]
Commentary / Consequences for Social Landlords
This Judgment now represents the leading authority on “forced entry” in Access Injunction proceedings.
It in effect affirms what His Honour Judge Berkley said in Sovereign Housing AssociationLimited v Ms Jane Hall in 2024: that a Judge at County Court level is empowered (by virtue of CPR 70.2A) to order that a Claimant landlord may carry out the “act required to be done”, namely the granting of access to the property in question for the purposes of inspection, by force if necessary.
Granted, it is only a County Court decision, and such a decision cannot bind any Court (including the County Court). However, the decision was made by a Senior Circuit Judge and the Designated Civil Judge for Hampshire, the Isle of Wight, and Wiltshire, and as such, carries persuasive weight. It is also the only reported judgment by a Circuit Judge to address, and depart from, District Judge Cridge’s judgment in Southern Housing.
As such, the oft-raised issue as to whether Judges have the power to award forced entry should no longer be in question; the question now is in what circumstances can it be awarded, and with what safeguards attached to it?
His Honour Judge Glen does, however, make clear his view that forced entry ought not be granted at first-instance, thus effectively codifying a two-stage process going forward: a first-instance injunction application, followed by an Application to Vary (to include forced entry provisions) should that injunction order be breached.
Importantly, however, the Judgment confirms the Court may award forced entry at the second stage -- i.e. the Judge retains ultimate discretion. As such, high evidential standards and a properly pleaded application remain paramount.
The Judge did, however, provide some interesting comments at paragraph 30 of his Judgment on the necessity for injunctive proceedings at all if a tenancy agreement provides the contractual consent for forced access which a landlord requires:
“[…] it is perfectly possible for tenancy agreements to be written in a way that provides that the tenant gives their express consent to entry in their absence, subject to certain conditions being fulfilled. Entry in such circumstances would not be a trespass, nor would a landlord obviously require the sanction of the Court to do something it was contractually entitled to do. […]” [30]
A plausible solution in some circumstances, perhaps, but caution should be heeded, and legal advice taken, before proceeding with such a course, as (despite HHJ Glen’s obiter comments), such a path remains strewn with risks to landlords.
It is also worth noting that, in this instance, the Claimant did have express provision in the tenancy agreement for the landlord to force access in an emergency. However, HHJ Glen’s decision was not in any way predicated on those provisions, and no indication was given that such provisions need be present in the tenancy agreement for an award of forced entry to be founded pursuant to the CPR 70.2A mechanism.
In terms of the ‘guidance’ given in paragraph 29 of the Judgment:
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The requirement for information regarding the identity and personal circumstances (including vulnerabilities) of the tenant and their household is now likely to become a core requirement of access injunction applications. Although, technically, not required until forced entry is requested in application to vary proceedings, it is advisable to include these details at first-instance to avoid unnecessary adjournments.
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The requirement for 48 hours’ prior notice to the tenant before entry by force is attempted is already standard wording across most injunction orders, but it does represent a step-up from the 24 hours’ notice requirement typically seen in tenancy agreements (and in potentially-relevant statutory provisions, such as s11 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 where access is sought in relation to works). Whilst HHJ Glen does not specify that such notice ought be in writing (as s11 of the above Act does), that is certainly the convention, and the easiest way to evidence compliance with the notice requirement.
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The requirement that a landlord should not proceed to utilise forced entry provisions if the tenant is present at the Property and “actively opposes” such entry is also good practice, and sensibly avoids any heated confrontations with occupiers of the Property. Appropriate wording should be included in draft orders to reassure the Court that entry by force will not proceed in such circumstances.
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The requirement for a provision for the affixing of a key safe to the outside of the Property also represents good practice and is a logistically practical solution to ensuring tenants can re-gain immediate access to their Property upon access having been forced: another common practice, now given some degree of ‘codification’.
Conclusion
The decision is an important one, and should put an end to the perception of some County Court Judges throughout England & Wales that they do not have the power to award forced entry. This is a case where a Senior Circuit Judge confirms that they do have such a power.
The Judgment doesn’t necessarily make it easy to secure forced access, and there are plenty of conditions and safeguards to be satisfied. Nonetheless, as far as decisions at County Court level go in this area of law, this is as good as it gets, and the Judgment represents a significant win for social landlords.
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